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Abstract. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data bans the processing of 
medical data owing to their highly sensitive nature. Fortunately the Directive 
provides that this ban does not apply in seven cases. The paper aims first to 
explain the reasons for this ban. Then it describes the conditions under which 
medical data may be processed under European Law. The paper investigates 
notably the strengths and weaknesses of the data subject’s consent as base of 
legitimacy for the processing of medical data. It also considers the six other 
alternatives to legitimate the processing of medical data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data [1] bans the processing of personal data concerning 
health (medical data) [2]. Naturally this prohibition applies equally to the processing of 
medical data in HealthGrid. This petitio principii  could have led to serious problems , 
notably for HealthGrid, if the Directive had not provided that this ban does not apply in 
several cases [3]. Before considering these exceptions, it seems relevant to remind the 
reason for this ban particularly since the latter apparently opposes the free movement of 
personal data [4].  
1. THE BAN ON PROCESSING MEDICAL DATA 
2. The regulation of the processing of personal data is based upon two main ideas. 
The first idea is that the economical, social, cultural and individual activities, with no 
public or private distinction, require in various extents the processing of information 
relative to natural persons. The second idea, intimately bound to the first one, is that 
natural persons must be protected against any infringement to their fundamental rights 
and freedoms that might arise from the processing of information relative to them. In 
other words, the processing of personal data is frequently needed for multiple good 
reasons. But, in the same time, the processing of personal data induces the danger to 
expose natural persons to grave risks of discriminations or infringements to their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. With respect to this and with this aim in view, the 
processing of personal data must comply with several rules expressing the balance 
between all the interests in presence. In this context  Directive 95/46/EC aims to ensure 
the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons (data subject), and 
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data [5]. 
This protection requires regulating the processing of personal data in order to prevent 
any infringement to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. 
To be effective and coherent this regulation has to be built on the analysis  of the risks 
capable to affect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. It is only 
possible to determine the conditions under which personal data can be processed in full 
respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects when these risks are 
identified.  
This risk assessment is particularly important since the recent evolutions of Information 
and Communication Technologies have multiplied the possibilities to process personal 
data and therefore increased the risks of infringement to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject. 
The use of a new technology such as HealthGrid should naturally induce the 
assessment of the new risks attached to its implementation especially in healthcare 
regarding the protection of medical data. 
3. The general principle is that the risk of infringement to the rights and freedoms of 
the data subject does not depend on the information content. But the risk depends on 
the purpose of the processing of personal data. In other words the potential or actual 
danger for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject has to be assessed 
regarding the purpose of the processing of personal data.  
But the principle is slightly – though not entirely – different for sensitive data [6]. It is 
commonly admitted that the sole content of these data already exposes the data subject 
to the risk of infringement of his or her fundamental rights and freedoms, whatever 
could be the purpose of the data processing. Put differently, any use of sensitive data is 
susceptible to create grave risks of discrimination for the data subject. Therefore 
sensitive data require a special protection taking into account their content and the 
purpose of their processing. 
With this end in view the Directive has decided that “data which are capable by their 
nature of infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy should not be processed (…)” [7].  
The ban on processing medical data is the special protection provided by the Directive 
to ensure the respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject 
regarding the processing of his or her medical data.  
Hence the ban on processing medical data should not be seen as opposed to the free 
movement of personal data. The ban on processing medical data is more a limit than an 
exception to the free movement of personal data. In fact the free movement of personal 
data can only be conceived in the full respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject and this respect includes the ban on processing medical data.  
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE BAN ON PROCESSING MEDICAL DATA 
4. Nevertheless the Directive grants permission to process medical data in seven 
hypotheses. In these ones the legitimacy of the processing of medical data (the balance 
between the interests in presence [8]) is formally presumed (cf. infra the necessity to 
really assess its legitimacy). This comes from the fact that, in principle, the situations 
described in these hypotheses should justify the processing of medical data, without 
prejudice for the other conditions ensuring the lawfulness of the data processing.  
These exceptions to the ban on processing medical data must be restrictively 
interpreted.  
The processing of medical data is strictly forbidden beyond these exceptions. 
The first hypothesis granting permission to process medical data is the consent of the 
data subject. The data subject’s consent is frequently presented as the natural base for 
the legitimacy of the processing of medical data.  
2.1. The consent of the data subject 
5. According to the Directive the ban on processing medical data does not apply 
where the data subject has given his or her explicit consent to the processing of his or 
her medical data [9]. 
In this case the Directive entrusts the data subject with the power to authorize the 
processing of his or her medical data [7]. This empowerment of the data subject 
represents without any doubt a very strong expression of his or her informational self 
determination – the power of the data subject upon his or her personal data – [10]. 
But this empowerment could also surprise. Is the data subject always capable to decide 
in a reasonable way about the processing of his or her medical data? Isn’t it too 
dangerous to give the data subject such power when most of the time he or she 
represents the “weakest” party or at least the “demanding” person in the processing his 
or her medical data? By example, how could a patient oppose the processing of his or 
her medical data for scientific purpose (ex. for a clinical trial) before a surgery or any 
other investigation? How to ensure the validity of the data subject’s consent and avoid 
a complete masquerade?  
This empowerment of the data subject should not be seen as unlimited or under no 
control. In fact when given this power the data subject has to evaluate the interest(s) 
that could justify the processing of his or her medical data. With this end in view the 
data subject has to put correctly into balance the interests in presence and to act 
accordingly. Otherwise the consent will not be able to legitimate the processing of his 
or her medical data (see infra  about the real control of the legitimacy of the processing 
of medical data and the determination of the interests in presence). 
The Directive confirms this analysis.  
6. Regarding the Directive the data subject's consent means “any freely given specific 
and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement 
to personal data relating to him being processed” [11]. 
First the consent has to be indubitable, indisputable, without any doubt. 
Then the consent of the data subject must have been freely given. In this regard the 
consent has to be free of any vice, constraint or pressure. With respect to this any direct 
profit (such as the benefit for his or her health) or indirect profit (such as the 
participation to the progress of medical science) for the patient should not affect 
automatically the validity of the data subject’s consent. Would the financial retribution 
of the data subject (beyond the cover of his or her eventual expenses ) invalidate his or 
her consent? Again, the answer to this question should not be absolute. It should 
depend upon the circumstances of each considered case and on how the applicable law 
deals with the protection of the data subject. 
Moreover the consent of the data subject has to be specific and informed. To be 
specific reminds insistently that the data subject must know exactly what he or she 
consents to. The latter implies necessarily the prior and adequate information of the 
data subject concerning the processing of his or her medical data. Without this prior 
and adequate information the consent of the data subject shall not be specific. 
Therefore and in any case the consent of the data subject could not ground the 
processing of his or her medical data.  
In this view the next question is logically the determination of the detail level of the 
provided information to the data subject. Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive determine 
the minimum content of this information. The latter must permit the complete 
enforcement of all the aspects of the data processing – such as the data quality, the data 
subject’s rights, the security and confidentiality measures, the notification to the 
supervisory authority, etc. –. However there is no doubt that the information has to be 
more accurate and complete particularly since very sensitive data as medical data are 
processed.  
In any case the data subject may not give an unspecified or uninformed consent to the 
processing of his or her medical data.  
Further processing of medical data is prohibited when incompatible with the initial 
purpose for which data have been collected. 
The consent must be given prior the time of the data collection. It must not be given 
necessarily at the same time; it only has to be obtained prior the processing. 
7. The consent of the data subject must be explicit to allow the processing of his or 
her medical data [12].  
A contrario, the requirement of an explicit consent should exclude any implicit consent 
– whatever could mean this last notion –. With respect to this, beyond the indisputable 
character of the data subject’s consent, its explicit characteristic presumes that it has 
been expressed. Several Member States have decided to transpose this requirement by 
asking for a written consent from the data subject. 
However the explicit consent could be deduced from some other behaviour of the data 
subject especially regarding the circumstances of the case. Indeed some positive actions 
could express the explicit consent of the data subject to the processing of his or her 
medical data, such as the participation to a foundation fighting against the disease 
affecting the data subject or as the demand to be treated in a special medical unit 
notoriously known as being a research unit. 
8. In all these circumstances the consent of the data subject induces a presumption of 
legitimacy of the processing of his or her medical data. It is assumed that the data 
subject has correctly assessed the interests in presence and acted accordingly. If the 
data subject has not correctly assessed the interests in presence and if the interests in 
presence are not respected, his or her consent will not legitimate the processing of his 
or her medical data. The latter will not be legitimate on this ground. 
In other words the consent of the data subject does not exonerate the data controller 
from pursuing a legitimate purpose (inducing the balance between the interests in 
presence) and the consent of the data subject may not cover the illegitimate interest or 
the lack of interest of the data processing. 
9. The Directive provides that Member States may oppose the possibility for the sole 
consent of the data subject to lift the prohibition from processing medical data [13].  
10. In any case the data subject may always revoke his or her consent to the processing 
of his or her medical data. What are the consequences of this  revocation? Does it mean 
that, in the future, new operations upon the data subject’s medical data will not be any 
more possible (without any effect on the existing data processing) or do we have to 
considered that the operations realised upon the medical data on the ground of the 
initial consent of the data subject may not be pursued ? 
Since the data subject has revoked his or her initial consent there is no more legitimate 
base for the processing of the medical data. The operations may not be pursued. That 
does not mean that the past operations realised upon the medical data of the data 
subject are now unlawful. It simply means that they can not be pursued except on the 
ground of another base of legitimacy.  
11. Finally the Directive gives no formal indication on the nature of the consent given 
by the data subject or on the possible contractual relationship between the data 
controller and the data subject.  
In our views the solution to these questions depends on how the applicable law deals 
with the relationship between the data controller and the data subject and with the 
relationship between the data subject and his or her personal data. In any case the 
possible contract should obey the special rules imposed through the transposition of the 
Directive in the applicable law such as the characteristics of the data subject’s consent, 
the data quality, the data subject’s rights, the security and confidentiality measures, the 
notification to the supervisory authority, etc. 
The applicable law determines also the capacity to consent for underage or disable 
persons.  
Regarding the previous developments, it is not sure that the consent of the data subject 
represents  the best solution to ground the legitimacy of the processing of medical data 
in HealthGrid. Fortunately the Directive provides alternative solutions to legitimate the 
processing of medical data. 
2.2. Carrying out obligations and specific rights of the data controller in the field of 
employment law 
12. The ban on processing medical data does not apply where the “processing is 
necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of the 
controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law 
providing for adequate safeguards” [14]. 
With respect to this, the purpose of the data processing is only to allow the data 
controller to fulfill his obligations and rights in the matter of Employment Law, the 
latter must being specific. This hypothesis seems to cover Medical Inspection.  
Then the processing of medical data has to be necessary and not only useful to this 
purpose. Therefore the data controller has to prove the necessity to process medical 
data to carry out his obligations and specific rights in the field of Employment Law.  
Finally this kind of processing has to be authorized by the applicable law providing for 
adequate safeguards, the latter being not further determined.  
2.3. Vital interests 
13. The third hypothesis allowing for the processing of medical data is where 
“processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another 
person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent” 
[15]. 
The notion of “vital interest” means expressly and exclusively the situation of an 
imminent danger to the life of a natural person. This covers the protection of the vital 
interests of the data subject but also of any other natural person. However in this last 
situation the Directive adds that the data subject mu st be physically or legally incapable 
of consenting to the processing of his or her medical data. It can not be deduced from 
this disposition that the data subject, physically or legally capable of consenting, could, 
without any consequence, refuse to authorize the processing of his or her medical data 
when the vital interests of another person are at stake. The qualification of this 
behaviour should be qualified under the applicable law.  
2.4. Non profit organisation 
14. The processing of medical data could be legitimate where the “processing is 
carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate guarantees by a 
foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a political, 
philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the processing 
relates solely to the members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with 
it in connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party 
without the consent of the data subjects” [16]. 
With respect to this the organization must have a non profit purpose and the latter has 
to be relative to the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms [7].  
2.5. Data manifestly made public and establishment, exercise or defence of legal 
claims 
15. The ban on processing medical data does not apply where “the processing relates 
to data which are manifestly made public by the data subject or is necessary for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims” [17]. 
It has to be reminded that, even if manifestly made public by the data subject, the 
processing of his or her sensitive personal data falls  nevertheless under the scope of the 
Directive. Hence the data controller must comply with all the other conditions ensuring 
the lawfulness of the data processing. 
2.6. Healthcare purpose 
16. The ban on processing medical data does not apply “where processing of the data 
is required for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of 
care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and where those data are 
processed by a health professional subject under national law or rules established by 
national competent bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy or by another 
person also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy” [18]. 
The healthcare purpose should be interpreted broadly [19] including the management 
of healthcare services. The latter should include secondary purposes necessary to 
provide healthcare such as medical secretaries, computer Departments, etc. By contrast, 
this hypothesis does not include Social Security purposes or Public Health purposes  (cf. 
infra 2.7). 
Medical data mu st be processed by a health professional, but this last notion has not 
been further defined. The health professional has to be subject under national law or 
rules established by national competent bodies to professional secrecy. 
When not processed by a health professional, the processing may be carried out by 
another person if he or she is subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy notably due 
to his or her status or by way of contractual stipulation or term.  
It is quite remarkable that the patient’s consent is not required to legitimate the 
processing of medical data. Might there be confusion with the consent to the provision 
of healthcare ? 
2.7. Reasons of substantial public interest 
17. The Directive grants Member States with permission to lay down additional 
exemptions for reasons of substantial public interest [20]. Hence the Member State has 
to prove in each case the real existence of the considered substantial public interest(s). 
The Directive had essentially in mind substantial public interests relative to Public 
Health and Social Security “especially in order to ensure the quality and cost-
effectiveness of the procedures used for settling claims for benefits and services in the 
health insurance system (…)” [21]. It had also in mind scientific research and public 
statistics [21].  
The cases where medical data may be processed must be laid down by national law or 
by decision of the supervisory authority.  
But Member States may only allow for the processing of medical data if these 
exceptions are subject to the provision of suitable safeguards to protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subjects and especially their right to respect for private 
life [21]. The Directive does not determine these safeguards. 
Member States must notify to the European Commission the exemptions to the ban on 
processing medical data adopted on this base [22]. 
Member States must determine the conditions under which a national identification 
number or any other identifier of general application may be processed [23]. 
3. REAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PROCESSING OF 
MEDICAL DATA 
18. The legitimacy of the processing of medical data is not complete when only 
formally fitting into one of these exceptions to the ban on processing medical data, 
even with the consent of the data subject. Indeed these exceptions are only hypotheses 
where the legitimacy of the data processing is formally assumed.  
Now the legitimacy of the processing of medical data – the balance of the interests in 
presence – has to be really assessed. 
First the interests in presence have to be identified. Are they only the interests of the 
data controller and of the data subject or should we also consider the interests of third 
concerned parties and of the whole society? In our view these two last categories of 
interests should be taken into account when evaluating the legitimacy of the processing 
of medical data. 
Then the explicit and valid consent of the data subject presumes, until contrary proof, 
the existence of an acceptable balance between the interests in presence in the 
processing of his or her medical data. However, in this case, it is quite difficult to 
assume that the data subject has adequately taken into account interests other than 
one’s own.  
In any case the processing of medical data will not be legitimate if the balance between 
the interests in presence is not respected, even with the regular consent of the data 
subject. 
19. But the legitimacy of the processing of medical data is definitely and very usefully 
strengthened by the additional consent of the data subject. That is the reason why we 
must firmly approve and recommend the ethical practice aiming to obtain the consent 
of the data subject when processing medical data. This practice is frequent in the 
conduct of clinical trials and in telematic networks in healthcare. 
20. Finally, it has to be stressed that the data controller may not legitimate the 
processing of medical data on other bases. That excludes necessarily the use of the 
hypotheses of formal legitimacy enumerated in article 7 of the Directive for non-
sensitive personal data. By example the data controller may not legitimate the 
processing of medical data by the balance of the interests in presence without 
respecting the hypotheses enumerated in article 8.  
CONCLUSIONS 
21. The protection of medical data implies to fix the rules applicable to the processing 
of medical data and hence to determine their conditions. With regard to their highly 
sensitive nature, medical data require a special protection taking into account their 
content and the purpose of their processing. Therefore Directive 95/46/EC has decided 
to prohibit the processing of medical data. However the Directive provides that this ban 
does not apply in several cases. In these cases the legitimacy of the processing of 
medical data is formally assumed without prejudice for the other conditions ensuring 
the lawfulness of the data processing. These exceptions to the ban on processing 
medical data have to be restrictively interpreted. 
The explicit and valid consent of the data subject constitutes the very first source of 
legitimacy for the processing of his or her medical data even if, at the same time, it is 
the weakest base to legitimate the processing of medical data due to the strict 
conditions for its validity and to the possibility for the data subject to revoke his or her 
consent at any time and without justification (but with reasonable notice in some case?).  
Nevertheless even if the data controller may legitimate the processing of medical and 
even with the consent of the data subject, the legitimacy of the data processing must be 
really assessed in each case by the balance of the interests in presence. These include 
the interests of the data subject, of the data controller, of third concerned parties and of 
the society.  
In any case the consent of the data subject does not cover the lack of legitimacy or the 
illegitimacy of the processing of his or her medical data. The consent of the data 
subject only creates the presumption of legitimacy of the processing of medical data 
until proof of the contrary. 
Finally we must approve and recommend very strongly and warmly the ethical practice 
requiring the consent of the data subject when processing medical data, even the latter 
might rely on another base of legitimacy.  
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